other emerging economies will ultimately integrate into the West-centered liberal order-the eventual assimilation view. In contrast, pessimists contend that China will challenge the United States and the American-led world order-the systemic conflict view. The behavior of international financial institutions is an important indicator of whether a state is pursuing status quo or revisionist foreign policies, an issue of increasing significance in light of China's rise. 2 This article argues that the dichotomous views fail to capture China's nuanced and balanced attitude towards global financial governance. Beijing's interaction with regional and global financial institutions suggests neither one-way assimilation into an American-centered liberal order nor a collision course with the United States and its Group of Seven (G-7) allies.
Beijing seems to be walking a fine line between assimilation and confrontation. Since the early 2000s, China has been pursuing a counterweight strategy to avoid overdependence on existing global institutions by developing a regional supplement (or potential alternative) while maintaining collaborative relations with the G-7 centered global institutions. This strategy has enabled China to better position itself in the evolution of the international monetary order without antagonizing key players outside the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing is hedging its economic bets on the creation of regional institutions and the revision of global institutions. Such behavior will facilitate the emergence of a more fragmented and multilayered form of global financial governance in the twenty-first century. 2 The eventual assimilation view tends to highlight that Western global economic governance is universally accepted because China and other rising powers have consistently participated in, for example, WTO negotiations or IMF meetings. However, this claim may be partially correct. One cannot rule out the possibility that Chinese behavior may prove to be revisionist, albeit not revolutionary, in that China has been (and will be) gradually counterbalancing Western influence and revising key components of the existing international order from within.
The empirical findings of the article also have broader implications for academic and policy debates over power transition in international relations-the rise and fall of great powers and the subsequent impact on international conflict and cooperation. To extend the logic of China's financial multilateralism, one may even cautiously anticipate that if a rising China takes a middle-of-the-road approach towards other dimensions of regional and global governance, such as security, trade, environment and energy, today's power transition would generate a more decentralized and fragmented form of global governance, which challenges the dichotomous views of 'eventual assimilation' and 'systemic conflict.' This point seems to be not sufficiently highlighted by students of Chinese foreign policy and power transition.
Some caveats are in order. This study does not intend to make a systematic test of all the relevant theories 3 or conduct an in-depth case study of specific financial policies. For 4 reasons of space, the article focuses on politically high-profile cases which involve Chinese top decision makers, instead of discussing a variety of all the different aspects of the global and regional financial systems. Despite the potential danger of selection bias, hopefully this approach may generate useful insights and hypotheses that can be tested by future research in a more rigorous manner.
The article is organized as follows. The following section provides a brief overview of the key macrostructural changes that have allowed China to bargain with regional and global financial institutions. The focus here is on power, norms and institutions at the international level. The second section discusses Beijing's perception and attitude towards the evolving international monetary order. 4 Specifically, this section highlights China's sense of uncertainty about reforming global institutions and creating regional ones. 5 The third section examines as opposed to an ideological, universal and rule-binding one, and a regional identity based upon shared experiences of (semi- Because China has become less dependent on the keystone international financial institutions, it has a wider range of policy options and greater capacity to influence or assist international institutions.
The second of the structural changes is related to international norms, specifically, the shift from the "Washington Consensus" to normative fragmentation. 13 There seems to be a 
Uncertainty about the Evolving International Monetary Order
China's policy elites are increasingly aware of the usefulness of multilateral cooperation and institutions in dealing with global challenges including international financial problems. the United States was unwilling and Great Britain was unable to provide global public goods. 33 The consequence was a period of ineffective global governance. The capacity and willingness of today's (relatively declining) hegemon, the United States, to assume the responsibility of providing global public goods remain to be seen. In other words, during today's power transition, neither a rising power nor a reigning power seems to be capable of setting the terms of global financial governance on its own, thus increasing the sense of uncertainty about the future trajectory of the international monetary system.
At the same time, skepticism and uncertainty about the feasibility of East Asia's efforts to create more cohesive regional arrangements or institutions prevails both within and outside However, in a skeptic's view of the regional identity, political tensions over historical issues and disputed territories remain a potential threat to the salience of the East Asian identity.
Strong nationalism and weak regional identity may continue to serve as an impediment to a spirit of regional cooperation. 36 Relatedly, the deep competition between China and Japan for regional leadership could also make regional institutions fragile. Thus it remains unknown whether the region's political dynamics and evolving regional identity would frustrate East Asia's collective efforts to promote financial regionalism. In sum, the ambiguity and uncertainty 
Counterweight Strategy: The Choice of Not Making a Choice
At the moment, China seems intent on exploring both global and regional options lest it should limit the range of strategic options available to itself. It intends to acquire more say over the running of the world economy and to resist the pressure of the reigning powers through its counterweight strategy. At the global level, while continuing to call for more substantial reforms on the existing global financial architecture, Beijing has been neither a key policy innovator nor a principal objectionist vetoing major policy initiatives. China has played a constructive role in the institutionalization of the G-20 summit and the reform of the FSF/FSB even though it did not take the lead in those global initiatives. In concert with Brazil, Russia, and India, China also agreed to contribute to IMF reserves, through the purchase of IMF bonds denominated in Special Drawing Rights, a weighted basket of major currency. In doing so, one may claim that China modestly sought to generate alternative to the dollar as a reserve currency. 37 However, it is important to stress that although China publicly endorsed the idea of revamping the dollar-based reserve system (which was indeed initiated by Russia), a notable departure from its usual low-profile behavior, it did not push too hard for the system's selectively adopted only what it needed from western regulatory models, adapted them to Chinese local circumstances, and implemented it in a gradualist manner to achieve domestic financial reforms. 44 For example, while Beijing largely accepted the Basel norm of 'system stability', it has been more skeptical and reluctant to accept the Basel norm of 'competitive equality,' which was intended to diminish competitive inequalities among international banks.
In China and Japan) to act alone or to block decision made by a majority of other countries as the threshold for approval -more than two-thirds of the total votes is needed to approve some key decisions -was set high under the CMIM. Without China's embrace of the 'self-restraining' component of the CMIM voting structure, the CMIM could not have come into being in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
China has also been making a significant contribution to the creation of the Asian Bond The recent global financial crisis has generated heated debates over the future of global financial governance. Some leading experts contend that the world would face a "more decentralized and fragmented form of international financial governance", a new geopolitical reality that comprises a "variety of regional systems," or a "leaderless currency system." 56 The strategic behavior of a rising China could reinforce these decentralizing trends in international financial governance. As the international monetary system is presently in flux, one cannot judge whether China's policy toward international financial institutions is revisionist or status quo. It is obvious that China's counterweight strategy is unlikely to reverse the decentralizing tendency in global financial governance in the near future. China is not an immediate cause but can be a facilitator of the fragmentation and decentralization of global financial governance.
China would continue to advocate a minimalist approach to regional institutions. This sovereignty-sensitive approach may encourage East Asia to adopt the least controversial principles possible, with which all Asian member countries must comply, while allowing for greater policy flexibility. For instance, a country that is focused more on financial stability (or security) than on financial innovation (or development) would not only be required to meet regionally coordinated minimum principles and standards for the Asian bond market, but would also be allowed to apply stricter regulations to the financial activities of both national and universal regulations. Meanwhile, the China-centered CMIM intends to complement the role of the IMF in crisis management in the long run. While its IMF linkage has made the CMIM look less independent and exclusive, the CMIM also has the potential to develop an independent regional surveillance mechanism and a regionally-tailored conditionality, which could be a significant departure from the 'one-size-fits-all' IMF approach.
57
As a result, global, regional, or even bilaterally tailored institutions and arrangements may coexist and compete with or complement one another. This is inconsistent with both the views of eventual assimilation and systemic conflict. At this juncture, we cannot make any definitive conclusions on transformations we are living through not least because we are still living with the midst of the global financial crisis, power transition and normative fragmentation.
Nonetheless, hopefully this non-dichotomous view of Chinese foreign financial policy can make an initial contribution towards a growing body of research on rising powers' sophisticated attempts at reshaping the prevailing global governance in the post-global crisis world. 57 In addition to China's promotion of the CMIM and the ABF, while it is somewhat too early to conclude, to implement them, and collecting regional inputs for the FSB decision making process.
